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et al.: Due Process

DUE PROCESS
N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 6:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law.
U.S. CONST. amend. V:

No person shall. .. be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ....
U.S. CoNsr. amend. X,

§ 1:

No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ....
COURT OF APPEALS
People v. Wright1

(decided October 31, 1995)
Defendant Vicki-Crystal Wright, convicted of second-degree
assault, alleged that her constitutional right to due process under
both the Federal2 and New York State Constitutions 3 was
violated when the state did not apprise her of the fact that the
victim of the assault was a police informant. 4 The defendant
alleged that this type of evidence was Brady5 material and,
1. 86 N.Y.2d 591, 658 N.E.2d 1009, 635 N.Y.S.2d 136 (1995).
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ...

"

Id.

3. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This provision provides in pertinent part:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." Id.
4. Wright, 86 N.Y.2d at 593-94, 658 N.E.2d at 1009, 635 N.Y.S.2d at
136.
5. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Petitioner (Brady) and his
companion (Boblit) were found guilty of first degree murder in separate trials.
Id. at 84. During Brady's trial, he testified to having participated in the
murder, but not to actually killing the victim himself. Id. Prior to trial, Brady
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therefore, a new trial was required. 6 The New York Court of
Appeals held that the information withheld from the defendant
would have been exculpatory under the circumstances of this
case, and based on Criminal Procedure Law section 440.10
[hereinafter "CPL"], 7 the defendant's conviction should be
reversed. 8 The court stated that "Washington's history as a police
informant was both favorable and material to the defense, and the
People's failure to disclose this information to the defense
violated defendant's constitutional right to due process." 9

had asked the prosecutor to allow him to examine all of Boblit's extrajudicial
statements. Id. The prosecutor turned over all of the statements, except for one
where Boblit admitted to killing the victim himself. Id. The Court held that
"suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id.
at 87. In addition, the court stated that "[a] prosecution that withholds evidence
on demand of an accused which, if made available, would tend to exculpate
him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the
defendant." Id. at 86-87.
6. Wright, 86 N.Y.2d at 595, 658 N.E.2d at 1010, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
7. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(g), (h) (McKinney 1992).
Section 440.10 states in pertinent part:
1. At any time after the entry of a judgment, the court in which it was
entered may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate such judgment
upon the ground that:
(g) New evidence has been discovered since the entry of a
judgment based upon a verdict of guilty after trial, which
could not have been produced by the defendant at the trial
even with due diligence on his part and which is of such
character as to create a probability that had such evidence
been received at the trial the verdict would have been more
favorable to the defendant; provided that a motion based
upon such ground must be made with due diligence after the
discovery of such alleged new evidence; or
(h) The judgment was obtained in violation of a right of the
defendant under the constitution of this state or of the United
States.
Id.
8. Wright, 86 N.Y.2d at 598, 658 N.E.2d at 1012, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 139.
9. Id.
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Defendant and the victim, Washington, met at a bar, and after
speaking and having a few drinks, they decided to go back to
defendant's apartment. 10 However, the events which followed
were contested.
Washington testified as follows: While they were at the bar, he
and defendant were "hugging, kissing and holding hands." 11
Once they arrived at the defendant's apartment, they both went
into the bedroom where Washington undressed in the defendant's
presence, placing his clothes on the floor by the bed. 12 He sat on
the bed while defendant exited the bedroom. 13 When she
returned, she was wielding a knife which she used to stab him in
the penis and chest, while shouting at him. 14 After this
confrontation, Washington testified that he got dressed, threw a
flower pot at the bedroom door and then exited the apartment
with a radio. 15 Upon hailing a cab, he requested that the driver
take him home; however, the driver proceeded to a local
hospital, despite Washington's objections. 16
The defendant, however, presented a completely different
version of what had transpired at the apartment. She testified that
when she was ready to leave the bar in which she had met
Washington, she discovered that her coat was missing. 17
Washington told her that his friend had the coat and that he
would call him, but not from the bar. 18 The defendant, allowing
Washington to come to her apartment, told him to use the phone
in the living room while she went in the bedroom to hide her
pocketbook.19 While she was in the bedroom, Washington came
into the room naked, and told defendant "I want to * * * you." 20
Afraid that she was about to be raped, she grabbed a knife that
10. Id. at 594, 658 N.E.2d at 1009, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

16. Id.at 594, 658 N.E.2d at 1009-10, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 136-37.
17. Id.at 594, 658 N.E.2d at 1010, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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was lying on the dresser and stabbed Washington. 2 1 She then
forced him out of the apartment and dialed 911.22
In his police report, Officer Douglas Walczak stated that he
found a hat, shoe and a pair of boxer shorts outside of
defendant's bedroom. 23 Contrary to this report, he testified that
he found the shoe and shorts in the bedroom and the hat at the
doorway of the room. 24 There was also a discrepancy between
Detective Sean Keane's report and his testimony at trial. In his
report, he stated that Washington had told him that he was
attacked while on his way to the bedroom, while not wearing any
clothes. 25 However, at trial, Detective Keane testified that he was
not completely sure if Washington had made that statement to
him or not. 26 During their deliberation, the jury requested a read
back of Officer Walczak's testimony regarding the place where
Washington's clothes were found. Thereafter, the jury convicted
27
defendant of second-degree assault.
Defendant subsequently filed a motion under CPL section
440.10 vacate the judgment of conviction. 2 8 After the conviction,
the defendant discovered that Washington was an informant with
the Albany Police Department. 29 She argued that a new trial was
necessary to rectify the fact that new evidence was discovered
and that Brady material was not fully turned over to the
defense. 30 The state did not dispute the fact that Washington was
an informant, however, the state maintained that he was not
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 594, 658 N.E.2d at 1010, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
Id. at 594-95, 658 N.E.2d at 1010, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
Id. at 595, 658 N.E.2d at 1010, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
Id.

29. Id.

30. Id. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 677 (1985) (stating that
"when the reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or
innocence, nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within the
general rule of Brady"); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972)
(stating that "deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of
known false evidence is incompatible with rudimentary demands of justice").

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss3/12

4

et al.: Due Process

1996]

805

DUE PROCESS

acting in that capacity in this case. 3 1 In addition, the state tried to
justify its action by stating that the trial prosecutor was not aware
32
that Washington was a police informant.
The lower court denied defendant's motion on the ground that

the discovery with regard to Washington's status as an informant
was not considered new evidence. 3 3 The appellate division
affirmed the judgment of the conviction, as well as the denial of
the section 440.10 motion. 3 4 Neither the lower court nor the
appellate division discussed the issue of whether Washington's

informant status constituted Brady material. 35 However, the New
York Court of Appeals determined that Washington's informant

status was Brady material
36
defendant's conviction.

and, therefore,

reversed the

31. Wright, 86 N.Y.2d at 595, 658 N.E.2d at 1010, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
See People v. Ciaccio, 47 N.Y.2d 431, 438, 391 N.E.2d 1347, 1350, 418
N.Y.S.2d 371, 374 (1979) (holding that by not alleging the untruthfulness of
facts in issue, the people impliedly conceded them); People v. Gruden, 42
N.Y.2d 214, 216, 366 N.E.2d 794, 796, 397 N.Y.S.2d 704, 706 (1977)
(stating that "what is not disputed is deemed to be conceded").
32. Wright, 86 N.Y.2d at 595, 658 N.E.2d at 1010, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.at 596, 658 N.E.2d at 1010, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 137. See Gruden, 42
N.Y.2d at 215, 366 N.E.2d at 795, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 705. In Gnrden, the
People claimed that error was committed when an indictment was dismissed
without a hearing, even though that the facts were not expressly conceded. Id.
The Gruden court held that a motion to dismiss can be granted unless it is
shown that there is a question of fact to be resolved. Id.at 217, 366 N.E.2d at
797, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 706. See also N.Y. CR~i. PRoC. LAW § 440.30(3)
(McKinney 1992). Section 440.30(3) states in pertinent part:
Upon considering the merits of the motion, the court must grant it
without conducting a hearing and vacate the judgment or set aside
the sentence, as the case may be if:
a) The moving papers allege a ground constituting legal basis for
the motion; and
b) Such ground, if based upon the existence or occurrence of facts,
is supported by sworn allegations thereof; and
(c) the sworn allegation of fact essential to support the motion
are ...conceded by the people to be true ....
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The United States Supreme Court, in Brady v. Maryland,37 set
forth the rule that the prosecution has a duty to give to the
defense all material evidence that is favorable to the accused and
goes toward proving guilt and/or punishment. 3 8 Citing Brady, the
court, in Wright, noted that for years, New York has held that it
is the prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory information and,
if this is not done, there is a violation of defendant's
constitutional right to due process. 39
The first issue that had to be addressed by the court was
whether the evidence came within the scope of the Brady rule. 40
Addressing this issue, the New York Court of Appeals reasoned
that the fact that Washington was an informant for the police
would have been favorable evidence for the defense, because it
would have explained why and how the testimony at trial was so
different than what had been written in the police reports on the
date of the incident. 4 1 The police officers refuted their own
reports written at the scene; Walczak stated at trial that the
articles of clothing were found in the bedroom, and not in the
living room as he first reported, and Keane stated he could not
remember if Washington actually made the statements that Keane
reported he made on the night of the incident. 42 In addition, the
information that Washington was an informant would have
provided an explanation for the motive of the police in
disbelieving and arresting the defendant, rather than Washington,
37. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
38. Id. at 87.
39. Wright, 86 N.Y.2d at 696, 658 N.E.2d at 1010, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 137
(citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87). See People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 136
N.E.2d 853, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1956). In Savvides, the state's witness lied

about the lenient treatment he would be given if he testified against the
defendant. Id. at 556, 136 N.E.2d at 854, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 886. The Savvides

court held that it is of no consequence whether the prosecutor's behavior was
intentionally devious or prejudicial; what matters is that the impact was the
same - - in that it prevented a fair trial. Id. at 557, 136 N.E.2d at 855, 154
N.Y.S.2d at 887.
40. Wright, 86 N.Y.2d. at 595, 658 N.E.2d at 1011, 635 N.Y.S.2d at
138.
41. Id. at 596, 658 N.E.2d at 1011, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 138.
42. Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss3/12

6

et al.: Due Process

1996]

DUE PROCESS

807

even though the defendant was the one who made the 911 call
immediately after the incident. 43 Therefore, the court held that
Washington's status as a police informant was Brady material. 44
The next issue addressed by the court involved the
requirements for reversal. The evidence must not only be proved
45
to be favorable to the defendant, but it must also be material.
The court in Wright discussed a test for materiality known as the
"reasonable possibility" test described by the New York Court of
Appeals in People v. Villardi.4 6 The defendant in Wright claimed
that she made a specific request when she asked the prosecution
prior to the trial about "any deals, promises or agreements
entered into between the People or any agent thereof and any
prosecution witness." 47 The reasonable possibility test states that
if a specific discovery request is made by the defense for
information the defense deems important, the evidence is material
if there is a "reasonable possibility" that the prosecution's failure
to comply with the request for an exculpatory report contributed
to the verdict. 48 The defendant contended that her specific
request triggered the "reasonable possibility" test. 49 However,
the Wright court reasoned that even if the request did not invoke
the reasonable possibility test, the evidence was material
nonetheless because, had it been given, the result of the
proceedings would have been different. 50
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 76 N.Y.2d 67, 555 N.E.2d 915, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1990).
47. Wright, 86 N.Y.2d at 596, 658 N.E.2d at 1011, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 138.
48. Villardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 77, 555 N.E.2d at 920, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
49. Wright, 86 N.Y.2d at 596, 658 N.E.2d at 1011, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 138.
50. Id. at 597, 658 N.E.2d at 1011, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 138. See People v.
Chin, 67 N.Y.2d 22, 490 N.E.2d 505, 499 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1986). In Chin, the
defendant claimed that testimony given by a witness would have been
exculpatory and that it should have been revealed prior to trial. Id. at 33, 490
N.E.2d at 514, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 647. The Chin court held that if the
information was disclosed prior to trial, it would not have been material
because it would not have caused the proceeding to be different. Id. See also
People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41, 67, 468 N.E.2d 879, 891, 479 N.Y.S.2d 706,
718 (holding that when the defense makes either a general request or no
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Applying the material evidence test to the case at bar, the court
discussed the importance of Keane's and Walczak's changed
testimony. A critical issue in this case was whether Washington's
clothes were found in the bedroom, lending credence to his claim
that he was attacked, or whether his clothes were found outside
the bedroom, which would attest to the veracity of the
defendant's testimony that she was protecting herself against a
possible rape. 5 1 If the defendant knew Washington was an
informant, she could have offered the jury a possible explanation
as to why the policemen changed their testimony. 52 Another
argument that could have supported the defense's contentions
involved Washington's reluctance to go to the hospital, which
could have been evidence of "his consciousness of guilt [that
might] have undermined his credibility."' 53 Instead, the jury
heard the explanation that "because of his criminal record,
Washington did not expect justice from the system."' 54 In
addition, the court stated that "[h]ad the jury been aware that
Washington had a relationship with the local police, his efforts to
circumvent police discovery might have appeared even more
suspicious.",55
In addition, the court reasoned that the scope of Brady goes
beyond the knowledge of only one prosecutor. 56 Although the
state argued that the district attorney involved in the trial had no
personal knowledge about Washington being an informant, the
court stated that this fact was unavailing. 57 Reasoning further,
the court stated "the 'individual prosecutor has a duty to learn
any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the

request at all, failure to turn over exculpatory evidence would violate due

process if the "omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt which did not
otherwise exist"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1227 (1984).
51. Wright, 86 N.Y.2d at 597, 658 N.E.2d at 1011, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 138.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 598, 658 N.E.2d at 1012, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 139.

56. Id.
57. Id.
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government's behalf in the case, including the police.'"

58

As a

result, the government could not be absolved of their duty to turn
over Brady information that could be exculpatory merely because
59
the trial attorney was not aware of its existence.
In conclusion, the defendant's federal and New York State
constitutional rights to due process were violated when she was

not informed that the victim was a police informant. 6o Once the
elements set forth by the Supreme Court in the Brady case are
fulfiled, the Due Process Clauses under both the Federal and

State Constitutions are activated. 61 For many years prior to the
Brady decision, New York has required the prosecutor to
disclose exculpatory evidence. 62 Consequently, non-compliance
will trigger the state's due process clause. 63 In conclusion, both
federal and state law employ the rule in Brady as a catalyst to
invoke the Due Process Clause.

58. Id. (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1567 (1995)).
59. Wright, 86 N.Y.2d at 598, 658 N.E.2d at 1012, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 139.
See People v. Simmons, 36 N.Y.2d 126, 325 N.E.2d 139, 365 N.Y.S.2d 812
(1975). In a case involving robbery, the principal witness gave conflicting
testimony as to the identification of the intruders who entered his apartment on
two separate occasions. Id. at 129, 325 N.E.2d at 141, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
The witness' first statement was made at the grand jury hearing, but the
minutes of this proceeding were not turned over to the defense. Id. The
Simmons court held that "negligent, as well as deliberate, nondisclosure may
deny due process. Good faith, therefore, may not excuse even a negligent
failure to disclose unrequested exculpatory evidence where that evidence is
highly material to the defense." Id. at 132, 325 N.E.2d at 143, 365 N.Y.S.2d
at 816.
60. Wright, 86 N.Y.2d at 598, 658 N.E.2d at 1012, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 139.
61. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
62. Wright, 86 N.Y.2d at 595, 658 N.E.2d at 1010, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
63. Id.
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